The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification by García-Carpintero, Manuel
Disputatio, Vol. V, No. 36, October 2013
The Self File and Immunity to Error 
Through Misidentification
Manuel García-Carpintero
University of Barcelona
BIBLID [0873-626X (2013) 36; pp. 191-206]
There are two diverging views on singular thoughts: a ‘latitudinar-
ian’ or ‘liberal’ one (Sosa 1970, Hawthorne & Manley 2012) appeal-
ing to Fregeans, on which thinking a de dicto proposition that predi-
cates some property f with respect to some individuating concept a 
of x suffices for having a singular thought about x; and a narrower 
one attractive to Millians, on which it requires acquaintance — some 
special relation binding the thinker with the object of reference, a 
causal psychological relation like perception or memory. In Mental 
Files, François Recanati advances a liberalization of the acquaintance 
view which, even if I do not find it fully convincing, I will not ques-
tion here; I will assume that it deals well with Millian concerns from 
a perspective hospitable to the Fregean.1
Now, in the 1960s and 1970s Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued 
that thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ — de se thoughts — raise 
special issues. In the first section I briefly survey the data, and Per-
ry’s and Lewis’s contrasting proposals: while Lewis aims to account 
for de se thoughts by taking the subject away from such contents, 
which are thus properties instead of complete traditional proposi-
1 Recanati allows that one may have a singular thought when one opens a 
file merely on the basis of descriptive information. Thus, Leverrier had singular 
thoughts about Neptune when he introduced the name, as I (2008) have argued 
is correct. However, against what I (2010) think, Recanati does not allow for 
singular thoughts in cases of merely imagined acquaintance, or in cases in which 
the acquaintance is expected but never materializes, because there is no object or 
because the subject never comes to be in the relation with it: ‘The acquaintance 
relation may be anticipated without undermining the reference relation which 
is based on it, but if the acquaintance relation never comes about, the reference 
relation does not either’ (2012a: 164).
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tions, Perry offers an account compatible with traditional views. I 
also discuss Stalnaker’s argument for a form of the latter view, and 
Recanati’s take on it in Mental Files. In the second section I take up 
Recanati’s (2007, 2009) arguments for a subjectless view of the con-
tent of ‘implicit’ de se thought, on the basis that we can thus better 
explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. 
I argue that this is not the case, and I suggest that such a view is in 
tension with Recanati’s mental files approach to de re thought in gen-
eral and the Self concept in particular. I will thus take advantage of 
the occasion of this symposium on Mental Files to air a perplexity I 
have been harboring with regard to the compatibility of Recanati’s 
Lewisian account of de se contents and the mental files approach to 
content-ingredients he has been developing in his work, which are 
fully articulated in Mental Files.
1 De se thoughts
Following Castañeda 1966, Perry 1979 and Lewis 1979 showed that 
thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ — de se thoughts — require spe-
cial treatment, and advanced rival accounts. Perry introduces the 
problem with a celebrated example:
‘I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my 
cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on 
the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was 
making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became 
thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I 
was the shopper I was trying to catch.’ (Perry 1979: 33)
Before his epiphany, Perry has, according to latitudinarian accounts 
of de re thought, a belief about himself (under the individuating con-
cept the shopper with the torn sack) to the effect that he was making 
a mess; but this is insufficient for him to have the reflexive, self-
conscious belief that he would express in accepting ‘I am making a 
mess’, the one that leads him to rearrange the torn sack in the cart.
As Perry points out, it will not help to opt for a narrower account 
of de re thought:
‘Suppose there were mirrors at either end of the counter so that as I 
pushed my cart down the aisle in pursuit I saw myself in the mirror. I 
take what I see to be the reflection of the messy shopper going up the 
aisle on the other side, not realizing that what I am really seeing is a 
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reflection of a reflection of myself.’ (Perry 1979: 42)
Given that he is perceiving himself in the mirror, the narrower con-
ception allows for Perry to have a de re belief about himself, to the 
effect that he is making a mess; but this still falls short of the reflec-
tive, self-conscious belief manifested by acceptance of ‘I am making 
a mess’ and the cleaning up behavior. Castañeda’s amnesiac cases 
suggest that rich descriptive concepts are also unnecessary; for they 
are able to think about themselves in a fully self-conscious reflexive 
way, by using and understanding ‘I’ and related expressions for first-
personal reference while knowing precious little about themselves.
Propositional attitudes and speech acts are individuated by repre-
sentational contents that are taken to be propositions with absolute 
truth-values: given a full specification of a possible way for the world 
to be, propositions thus understood get a definite truth value with 
respect to it. Alternatively, propositions can be simply identified as 
classes of possible worlds, those with respect to which they are true. 
Thus, in believing that snow is white one represents worlds in which 
snow is white, and places the actual world among them. Lewis and 
Perry take de se thoughts to question this picture.
Lewis proposes to abandon the traditional theory of contents, and 
to take them to be properties instead of propositions: entities which 
are true or false, given a full characterization of a way for the world 
to be, only relative in addition to a subject and a time. Alternatively, 
the contents of propositional attitudes are, or at least select, not just 
classes or worlds, but rather classes of centered worlds: worlds together 
with a designated subject and a time. In coming to believe what he 
would express by accepting ‘I am making a mess’, Perry locates him-
self among all subjects making a mess at a given time and world.
On the traditional conception of contents the actual world is not 
part of the believed content, but in believing a proposition one as-
cribes it to the actual world at which the believing occurs; it is the 
attitude of believing, or the act of judging, which, as it were, as part 
of its ‘illocutionary’ nature, brings the world at which it occurs as 
the relevant one to evaluate the truth of the belief. A mere imagining 
with the same content would not similarly bring the actual world 
to bear, because imaginings are not evaluated as true or otherwise 
relative to whether the actual world where the imagining occurs is 
correctly represented by their contents. Similarly and by analogy, 
on Lewis’s view it is the attitude of believing itself, as opposed to 
its content, which brings to bear the subject and time relevant for 
the evaluation of its truth or falsity. Subjects who come to believe 
what they would express in English by uttering ‘I am making a mess’ 
believe the same contents, in the way that subjects who believe that 
snow is white at different worlds believe the same contents. This 
provides a nice solution to the initial problem of de se thought: if no 
descriptive conception of the subject (including ones allowing for de 
re thought on the narrow conception N) is sufficient for de se thought, 
and none appears to be needed, this is on Lewis’s view because the 
subject is not represented as part of the content, but is brought to bear 
for purposes of evaluation by the act of judging itself, not by its con-
tent. These perspectival contents that Lewis’s account posits have made 
a strong comeback to the philosophical scene in recent years, in the 
so-called relativist accounts advanced by writers such as Kölbel 2004, 
Egan 2007, 2010 or McFarlane 2003 for different areas of discourse: 
judgments of taste, epistemic modals, future-tense claims on the as-
sumption of indeterminism, among others.
On Perry’s alternative view, we should distinguish the content or 
object of the belief from the belief state through which it is accessed. 
The content is just a traditional proposition, de dicto or de re. The 
state is a specific condition of the subject, by being in which a given 
content is believed. Contents help to account for the role that propo-
sitional attitudes constitutively have in appraising the rationality of 
the subject, the adequacy of his beliefs to his evidence and of his ac-
tions to his beliefs and desires, the desirability of his desires, etc. But 
only in a coarse-grained way: for a full account of rational action we 
need not just the content, but also the specific state through which 
the content is accessed. In line with Frege’s puzzles, the previous 
cases involving de se thoughts show that traditional contents are not 
enough to appraise rationality and cognitive significance; ways of ac-
cessing them should also be taken into consideration.
Belief states themselves must hence have some kind of meaning or 
significance, if they are to have a role in appraising the rationality of 
actions or inferences. In his original account, Perry 1979 appeals to 
Kaplan’s 1989 distinction between character and content to character-
ize the significance of states. Utterances of ‘he is making a mess’ and 
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‘I am making a mess’ might have, in their contexts, the same singular 
content, but they have different characters. Similarly, Perry’s belief 
state when he looks at what is in fact his own reflection in the mir-
ror, and later when he catches up, are different states with the same 
content; given the differences in rational action to be expected from 
one and the other, states themselves must have a role in the explana-
tion of action and the cognitive significance of the belief in virtue of 
their character-like meaning.
Now, Stalnaker (1981: 145-8) objected to accounts such as Lew-
is’s and the original one by Perry just presented on the grounds that 
they cannot capture an ‘informational content’ that is an essential 
feature of utterances including essential indexicals, and advanced an 
alternative account appealing to the ‘diagonal propositions’ that he 
(1978) had introduced earlier. Like Perry, I prefer to think in terms 
of structured propositions, as opposed to possible-world ones (and 
in fact take them to be ontologically more fundamental), so I will 
not present the Perry-Stalnaker debate in terms of diagonal proposi-
tions; I will present it instead in terms of what I take to be essentially 
equivalent token-reflexive structured propositions.2
Let us imagine a variation on Perry’s supermarket story in which, 
contemplating the situation and realizing what is going on, a kind 
shopper warns Perry, which leads to Perry’s epiphany. He there-
by comes to accept ‘I am making a mess’ after being told ‘you are 
making a mess’. On Perry’s original view the contents of the beliefs 
thereby expressed are the ordinary, coarse-grained de re propositions 
which are conveniently identical for the two utterances. However, 
as we know, this singular content does not account for what Perry 
comes to know after the epiphany: he already believed it beforehand. 
Nevertheless, it seems that whatever explains Perry’s distinctive be-
havior after the epiphany was in this variation of the story communi-
cated to him by the other shopper’s utterance.
How could Perry’s or Lewis’s proposals account for this? The 
character-like contents corresponding to the shopper’s utterance, 
‘you are making a mess’, are very different from those correspond-
ing to the ones by means of which Perry would express his acquired 
knowledge, ‘I am making a mess’. The properties that the shopper 
2 The reader might find further elaboration in my 2006a.
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and Perry rationally self-attribute differ (addressing someone who is 
making a mess, making a mess, respectively), and the corresponding 
perspectival contents are similarly different. Alternatively put, it 
would be absurd for Perry to ascribe to himself the property that 
the samaritan shopper expresses — to wit, that of being addressing 
someone who is making a mess. For Lewis and Perry to deal with this 
consistently with their accounts, they should elaborate them so as to 
explain how it is that, in virtue of the shopper expressing a certain de 
se content, Perry comes to learn a different one.
On the simplest account of successful communication, the epi-
sode should be explained by Perry’s learning the very same content that 
the samaritan shopper expressed. This is what Stalnaker’s account in 
terms of diagonal propositions or token-reflexive contents purports 
to offer. We can think of the meaning of indexicals like ‘I’ or ‘you’ as 
token-reflexive rules, which, given a particular token, fix its referent 
relative to some contextual property: being the speaker who pro-
duced it, or its (most salient) addressee. This provides a descriptive 
(but not purely general) conception of the referent; in the case of the 
samaritan utterance of ‘you are making a mess’, we have a token-re-
flexive conception associated with the particular case of ‘you’, the ad-
dressee of that token.3 Both the samaritan shopper and Perry can share 
this way of representing him. So we have here an ordinary content, 
determining a traditional proposition, which is communicated from 
one to the other: the one we could explicitly articulate with ‘the ad-
dressee of that token of ‘you’ is making a mess’.
Perry 1993 accepts that, for the kind of consideration about in-
formational content that Stalnaker pointed out, these token-reflexive 
contents provide a better representation of the significance of belief-
states than the one he had earlier suggested in terms of Kaplanian 
characters. As Perry 2006 explains, however, this refined version 
of his account can be taken in the proper way if it is to provide an 
at least prima facie successful account for de se thoughts. On this in-
terpretation, the proposal is just a refined way of understanding the 
significance of belief-states; but an adequate account of de se contents 
(hence of the nature of attitudes and speech acts in general) still re-
3 I have discussed the role of these contents in detail elsewhere (1998, 2000, 
2006a).
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quires the distinction between belief-contents and belief-states (ways 
of accessing the content). The modification of Perry’s original pro-
posal lies only in that now the significance of belief-states is char-
acterized in the traditional propositional way that token-reflexive 
contents afford.
This still leaves us with the task of explaining the nature of states 
and contents and their interrelation. Perry has an account on which 
states are mental particulars that may be classified by their ‘official 
contents’ (the coarse-grained singular propositions) and also by a 
plurality of other finer-grained propositional contents, useful for dif-
ferent explanatory purposes. In my view, the appeal to the state/con-
tent distinction in the case of de se thoughts is just a particular case of 
the proper way to understand a Fregean view on the attitudes, which 
I (2000, 2006a) have argued requires ascribing a presuppositional 
nature to reference-fixing senses. I cannot elaborate on the details of 
my own view of de se senses here.4
Recanati (2012a: 211-18) provides an interesting account of the 
communication of de se contents that is compatible with this. On his 
proposal, the concepts/mental files that the speaker (the samaritan 
shopper in the variation on Perry’s original story above) express-
es and the hearer (Perry) comes to entertain as a result differ, as it 
should be, for Perry’s is his own Self concept, while this is not the 
one in the thought that his informant gives voice to. However, the 
latter evokes the former, because they share something: the linguis-
tic sense of the token indexical that the speaker uses, the addressee of 
this very token of ‘you’. I will come back to this below when I consider 
the consistency of Recanati’s perspectival content account of de se 
thoughts with his views on the Self file.
4 Peacocke (1983: Chapter 5; 2008: Chapter 3; 2012), Higginbotham 2003 
and Howell 2006 defend different proposals I am sympathetic to. On all of them, 
as Peacocke (2012: 145) puts it, it is constitutive of the Self concept as it occurs in 
a de se attitude-state that it refers to the thinker of the attitude. A simple version 
of this suggestion assumes a language of thought; the difference between the state 
individuated by a sentence corresponding to ‘I am making a mess’ and another 
individuated by ‘the addressee of that token is making a mess’ is that only the 
former includes an expression whose reference rule aims to pick out its subject.
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2 De se thoughts and immunity to error through misiden-
tification
Recanati 2007 argues for a (moderate) relativist account of some 
contents; in particular, he argues for a perspectival content account 
of ‘basic’ or ‘implicit’ de se thoughts, on which their possible-world-
contents must be given by centered worlds, along the lines of Lewis’s. 
Recanati offers a new argument for this sort of account; he defends 
it on the basis of observations about the phenomenon that Shoemak-
er characterized as immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’ 
henceforth):5
‘to say that a statement ‘a is j’ is subject to error through misidentifica-
tion relative to the term ‘a’ means that the following is possible: the 
speaker knows some particular thing to be j, but makes the mistake of 
asserting ‘a is j’ because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that 
the thing he knows to be j is what a refers to.’ (Shoemaker 1968: 557) 6
I will argue that IEM does not support the perspectivalist view, and 
suggest that rather the opposite is true. In more recent work, Re-
canati (2009 and 2012b) acknowledges some of the points that I will 
make, but he still defends the perspectivalist proposal on the basis of 
considerations about IEM. I will argue that they are unconvincing.7 
Moreover, I will argue that the Mental Files take on the Self concept 
and proto-concept is in tension with the account.
Consider the moment in Perry’s story when he sees what in fact 
is his image in a mirror with a torn sack. Imagine another variation 
on the story, in which this is in fact the ground for Perry’s epiphany, 
because this time he recognizes himself in the mirror; suppose then 
that he judges on this basis what he would express by ‘I am making 
5 Shoemaker suggests that IEM captures some of Wittgenstein’s points about 
uses of ‘I’ ‘as subject’ vs. uses of ‘I’ ‘as object’ in the Blue Book.
6 Pryor 1999 offers an alternative propositional characterization, free from 
concerns that this linguistic characterization — useful as a starting point — might 
raise. Pryor’s characterization also highlights the relativity to ways of reaching 
the relevant judgment and to normal circumstances that, as the examples below 
will make clear, any proper characterization should contemplate: a judgment can 
be IEM if made on a given epistemic basis in normal circumstances, and not if 
made on different bases or under abnormal conditions.
7 Stanley (2011: 91-3) and Morgan 2012 make related objections to Recanati.
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a mess’. Made on such epistemic grounds, the claim is exposed to 
the error that Shoemaker identifies: Perry might have been wrong 
in identifying himself with the person whose back is reflected in the 
mirror; he would then be right that someone is pushing a cart with a 
torn sack and is thus making a mess, but wrong to think that it is he 
who is making a mess. In the original version of the story, the epiph-
any comes instead from Perry seeing that he is pushing a cart with a 
torn sack. Consider Perry’s physical self-ascription, ‘I am pushing a 
cart with a torn sack’, made on the basis of his visual perception of 
the scene around him; or his psychological self-ascription, ‘I see that 
I am pushing a cart with a torn sack’. Neither of these claims appears 
to be open to that sort of error; nor is the thought he expresses by ‘I 
am making a mess’, when based on such epistemic grounds.
These examples show that, if there is a connection between de 
se thoughts and IEM, it must be indirect; for the thoughts Perry ex-
presses by accepting ‘I am making a mess’ in both cases are de se. 
The subtler connection might be this: ‘I’-thoughts that are IEM are 
fundamentally de se; those that are not are only de se derivatively, in 
that, in making them by using the first-person concept, the speaker 
identifies himself as the object of other, fundamentally de se thoughts. 
Recanati’s claims based on IEM on behalf of the property account of 
de se thought concern only the fundamentally de se. He (2007, 177) 
thus distinguishes explicit from implicit de se thoughts. The former are 
attitudes to traditional, full-fledged propositions, the latter to trun-
cated perspectival propositions.
Various writers including John Campbell, Christopher Peacocke 
and Crispin Wright have developed an account of IEM suggested by 
Evans that Wright 2012 calls ‘the Simple Account’. On the Simple 
Account, non-IEM thoughts are (roughly) thoughts the structure of 
whose epistemic justification depends on an identity claim;8 thus, for 
instance, Perry’s judgment ‘I am making a mess’ in the first version 
of the story in the second paragraph of this section, which was not 
IEM, depends on Perry’s identity judgment, I am that person reflected 
8 I say ‘roughly’ because there are further cases that are also not IEM but 
whose justification exhibit a more complex inferential structure, including the 
cases that Pryor 1999 calls ‘which-misidentification; cf. also Recanati 2012 and 
Wright 2012.
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in the mirror. This is why he might coherently consider that, although 
the existential ‘part’ of his claim — that someone is making a mess 
— is correct, he is mistaken in the identification, and it is not in fact 
he himself but someone else who is making a mess. On the Simple 
Account, IEM thoughts are negatively characterized as those that are 
not thus dependent on an identity claim.
This account crucially relies on the notion of doxastic justifica-
tion, hence on the problematic basing relation. There are well-known 
discrepancies among contemporary epistemologists that have imme-
diate resonance for our present issue. Certainly, that a judgment A 
is epistemically based on a certain claim B cannot require that the 
subject phenomenologically experiences his coming to judge A as 
a result of an inference in part from B; for Perry might well lack 
such inferential phenomenology in the above example of non-IEM 
thought. Consider Moore’s (in-)famous inference, (i) here are two 
hands, (ii) if there are hands, there is an external world, hence (iii) 
there is an external world. Given its validity, someone who judg-
es (i) is thus rationally committed to (iii); but there are different 
ways of understanding such commitments. Pryor 2004 distinguishes 
two epistemological attitudes we may have with respect to them, a 
liberal and a conservative one. On the conservative attitude, having 
prima facie justification to believe (i) requires antecedent justification 
to believe (iii); the liberal denies this, even though he agrees that 
evidence against (iii) would defeat our justification to believe (i). I 
would further distinguish two versions of the conservative attitude; 
on the most straightforward conservative-conservative version, jus-
tification for (i) would require a priori or empirical evidence for (iii); 
on a liberal-conservative one along lines explored by Wright (2004), 
it is enough if (iii) is a presupposition that one is entitled to make by 
default.
These views carry over to the status of identity claims that one 
might discern in the justificatory structure of our singular thoughts. 
The conservative-conservative attitude is the proper one concern-
ing Perry’s identification with the person whose back he sees in the 
mirror. Consider, however, the judgments mentioned earlier as ex-
amples of IEM: Perry’s physical self-ascription that he is pushing a 
cart with a torn sack, made on the basis of visual perception, or his 
psychological self-ascription that he sees that he is pushing a cart 
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with a torn sack. Shoemaker would consider them as cases of cir-
cumstantial, not absolute IEM; they are de facto IEM but under weird 
circumstances they could be subject to error through misidentifica-
tion. Imagine, for instance, that the science fiction technologies that 
films like Avatar contemplate could allow to block our own visual 
impressions and receive instead those coming from another body.9 
Under those circumstances, Perry’s judgments might be wrong be-
cause of the mistaken identification of himself with the body that 
is the source of the relevant visual impressions. We can interpret 
this in terms of the distinction between the liberal-conservative and 
the conservative-conservative attitudes. Even if the subject reason-
ably and in fact correctly took for granted in the context the identity 
premise, so that the judgment did not depend on it, there are con-
texts in which epistemically the judgment must be taken as made on 
the basis of the identity premise, for a circumstance in which it fails 
is a relevant alternative.
On this proposal, the commitment to identifications that ordi-
nary self-ascriptions based on visual perception in fact carry are un-
derstood along the lines of the liberal-conservative proposal above, 
as opposed to the conservative-conservative view that suggests itself 
as more appropriate for the mirror example: these identities are in 
normal contexts presuppositions to which we are entitled by default, 
without the need to have ordinary a priori or empirical evidence for 
them.10 We do not need to go into these issues any further. Note 
just that the explanation that the Simple Account affords appeals to 
the absence of an identity claim in the justificational structure; Re-
canati’s explanation appeals instead to the absence of a conception of 
the self in the content of the IEM judgments. The Simple Account 
helps us to distinguish two senses for a thought to have an identifica-
tion component. In the first sense (‘identificationP’), the epistemic 
grounds for the thought include an identity-premise. In the second 
sense (‘identificationC’), the thought includes a concept that identi-
fies what it is about. On the Simple Account, having an identifica-
tionC component is compatible with a thought being IEM; for being 
9 Dennett 1978 imagines such a scenario.
10 Cf. Coliva 2006, 2012 and Wright (2012: Sections 7-8); cf. also Peacocke 
(1983: 139-151) and Peacocke (2008: 92-103).
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IEM is lacking an identificationP component, and thoughts having 
identificationC components may well be identificationP free — they 
might even be epistemically basic. In contrast, Recanati’s account 
explains IEM by the absence of an identificationC element.
The Simple Account opens the possibility of thoughts includ-
ing identificationC components, which are nonetheless IEM with 
respect to them. And it seems to be the case that there are such 
thoughts. Wright 2012 offers as examples ‘you are very close’ and 
‘he is a long way off’, both based on observation; Peacocke 2008, 
‘this keyboard is black’, again based on observation. Hence, Recana-
ti’s 2007 account of IEM will not do. Recanati 2009, 2012b accepts 
this; he accepts it even for some first-personal IEM thoughts. Thus, a 
thought expressed by ‘my legs are crossed’, based on proprioceptive 
evidence, is IEM on his original account because the content is just 
the property of having crossed legs, which the subject self-ascribes. 
However, the thought expressed by ‘it is my legs, not my neighbor’s, 
that are crossed’ cannot plausibly be considered as not including the 
concept of the thinker’s leg. Nonetheless, it is still (circumstantially) 
IEM. Recanati suggests (2009: 259; 2012b: Sections 2.2 and 2.3) 
that this is only so because the ‘subject-explicit’ thought is derived 
through a process he calls ‘reflection’ from a ‘subject-implicit’ prop-
erty-ascription, and thus has the same grounds as the latter, lacking 
an identity-premise:
‘a judgment is immune to error through misidentification if it is im-
plicitly de se, that is, if the subject is not represented in the content of 
the judgment but his or her involvement is secured by the mode of the 
grounding experience; yet an explicit de se thought may also be IEM if 
it has the same grounds as an implicit de se thought.’
But how could this work for demonstrative thoughts? Recanati 
(2012b: Section 3) justifies the extension of the proposal to that case, 
but Wright 2012 raises serious concerns.
It thus seems that the perspectival content account of first-per-
sonal thoughts is no better placed vis-à-vis IEM than the token-re-
flexive proposal outlined in the previous section. On the contrary, 
the failure of Recanati’s attempt to extend his proposal to explain 
the IEM character of explicit (Self concept involving) de se thoughts 
to IEM thoughts relative to demonstrative concepts in general sug-
gests that the explanation of the IEM character of a thought (if there 
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is one) must be compatible with its having a full traditional proposi-
tion as content. Such an explanation, I submit, should come from the 
broadly token-reflexive nature that the alternative to the perspec-
tival content view presented in the previous section advances, i.e., of 
the relevant identificationC. Here is the core of a suggestion. Deploy-
ment of individual concepts takes for granted reference-fixing infor-
mation. A thought of the form A is P is IEM when the ascribed prop-
erty P is already ascribed to the referent of the concept A as part of 
its background reference-fixing information.11 On this suggestion, 
when being P is individuative, the identity A is the P is not a premise 
in the justificational structure of the judgment, but is rather (either 
de facto, i.e., merely circumstantially, or de jure) taken for granted in 
deploying concept A.
At first sight at least, to me a token-reflexive account of de se 
thoughts incorporating the kernel of an account of IEM just out-
lined fits Recanati’s 2012a views on the Self concept better than the 
perspectival content account. Simply put, mental files are individual 
concepts, and concepts are ingredients of contents. If the account of 
de se thoughts is that they deploy the Self mental file, then the con-
tents of de se thoughts have this concept as an ingredient. Recanati’s 
account of the communication of de se contents, outlined in the pre-
vious section, appears to assume the same. In the terminology used 
above, Recanati’s account of de se thoughts and their communication 
appears to involve an identificationC — the Self file.
Now, this only applies, I guess, to Recanati’s ‘explicit’ de se 
thoughts. He (2012a: 64) does envisage a Self* ‘proto-file’, which, 
unlike the full Self file, ‘can only host information gained ‘from in-
side’, in the first-person way and hence does not obey Evans’s ‘Gen-
erality Constraint’. I suppose the idea is that proto-files are vehicles 
for nonconceptual contents, and that it is the Self* proto-file that 
figures in basic, ‘implicit’ de se contents. But this does not help. On 
the best account I know of the conceptual/non-conceptual distinc-
tion (cf. García-Carpintero 2006b, Heck 2007) the difference has to 
do with the nature of the content-vehicles, in particular with their 
inferential potential — which is consistent with Recanati’s appeal to 
11 For the de se case, Peacocke (2012: 148-9) provides two suggestive exam-
ples that can be understood along these lines.
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breakdown of the Generality Constraint to characterize nonconcep-
tual content. On this view, vehicles for nonconceptual contents still 
make contributions to contents; hence no justification for the per-
spectival content account of de se thoughts can be gleaned from this 
either. Contentful states involving the Self* proto-file still appear to 
involve an identificationC.
12
I have taken advantage of the occasion of this symposium on Men-
tal Files to question Recanati’s (2007, 2009) grounds for his Lewisian 
account of de se contents, and also its compatibility with the mental 
files approach to content-ingredients articulated in the book. In the 
first section, I have contrasted the Lewisian, perspectival content 
approach with a token-reflexive elaboration on the Perry-Stalnaker 
traditional alternative. I presented the communication problem 
raised in favor of the latter, and I have suggested that Recanati’s pro-
posal to deal with it in the book appears to fit better the latter view. 
In this section I have argued that IEM does not give any advantage 
to the Lewisian view; rather, the opposite appears to be the case.13
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